ForTrust dWallet
Demo Relying Party (test client)
Test client showing how a third-party application authenticates an EUDI Wallet user via ForTrust.

Sign in with ForTrust Wallet

Verification: ARF strict Compatible

The WiFi credential scope requires a separate WiFi attestation pre-issued in the wallet. If the wallet only carries an mdoc PID, use Network access (PID) instead — it grants access on the identity the user already has.

Step 1: Your wallet needs a WiFi credential first. Issue one below, then come back and click Sign in.

📶 Issue WiFi credential (doctype ro.fortrust.wifi.access.1)

Requires staff admin sign-in (Django). After issuance, scan the QR from the issuance page to add the credential into your wallet.

Step 2: Sign in with ForTrust

Click → redirect to ForTrust → scan the QR or tap "Open wallet" → claims appear live.

For integrators

Same scope, but exactly the way a third-party application integrates: response_type=code + an S256 code_challenge → POST /oidc/token/ with the code_verifier → GET /oidc/userinfo/ with the bearer. Every step is shown on the return page.

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Demo: Verify straight from the browser (Digital Credentials API)

Pick PID, driving licence or age 18+, and Chrome asks any EUDI wallet installed on your phone for it — no QR to scan by hand. The request is OpenID4VP 1.0, the answer comes back encrypted and bound to this page's origin; at the end you see exactly the attributes presented, only in the browser that asked.

Open the DC API demo →
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Bank demo: a new client with the EUDI wallet

What a bank does with the wallet without waiting for the payment rules: identify the client, re-identify them periodically, issue them attestations — online and at the branch.

  1. Open an account online (KYC). Pick PID and press Sign in: the bank receives the PID attributes it asked for, signed by the issuer and verified — not a photo of an ID card.
  2. AML customer identification (PID + Photo ID). The AML request takes the PID and the Photo ID of the same holder in one presentation: the Romanian PID carries no address or document number (the MAI rulebook), the Photo ID does — everything AML identification asks, signed by the issuer.
  3. Refresh the client's data (re-KYC). The same flow, whenever the bank asks: the client confirms from the wallet, no trip to the branch.
  4. The bank issues an account attestation. In the demo issuer pick "IBAN — Bank Account · dc+sd-jwt": the client then shows proof of account to whoever asks, instead of a bank statement.
  5. At the branch. The validator app reads the PID or driving licence over NFC, offline too: the same signature and trust checks, no document copy.
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Demo: Payment with Strong Customer Authentication

The bank asks for a payment authorisation over OpenID4VP: the wallet receives amount and payee as transaction_data (TS12 §4.2), shows them exactly as the holder will authorise them (§3.3) — PSD2 dynamic linking (RTS Art. 5): the signature covers exactly that amount and payee, asks for the second factor right before signing and answers with the bank-account attestation, whose KB-JWT carries the Authentication Code and the factors applied (§3.6). The verifier requires all of it and refuses a reused code.

The wallet needs the bank-account attestation (SD-JWT VC): issue it here, type “IBAN — Bank Account · dc+sd-jwt”.

QR
Reference
Factors (amr)
Authentication code

What the demo RP sends to ForTrust

client_id
demo.rp.fortrust.ro
redirect_uri
https://dwallet.fortrust.ro/oidc/demo/callback/
nonce
lecrQKck83Dpvv9JAOiLIT-RZXOpkMR2
state (CSRF)
8QM5pLxRx8zrFD4Xb8tfaCfpwB2BYX3l
scope
openid wifi
response_type
vp_token (the standard button sends code + code_challenge)

Full request URL:

https://dwallet.fortrust.ro/oidc/authorize/?client_id=demo.rp.fortrust.ro&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fdwallet.fortrust.ro%2Foidc%2Fdemo%2Fcallback%2F&nonce=lecrQKck83Dpvv9JAOiLIT-RZXOpkMR2&scope=openid%20wifi&state=8QM5pLxRx8zrFD4Xb8tfaCfpwB2BYX3l&response_type=vp_token&policy=ARF_STRICT_V1

The flow (end-to-end)

  1. The user taps Sign in → the browser issues GET /oidc/authorize/
  2. ForTrust returns a page with the QR and starts polling /oidc/userinfo/{session_id}/
  3. The user scans the QR with the EUDI wallet (or taps "Open wallet" on the same device)
  4. The wallet posts POST /oidc/response/ carrying the vp_token
  5. ForTrust verifies signature, trust chain and policy, marks the session completed
  6. The browser receives the verdict, renders the claims, and the RP is notified at redirect_uri?code=&state=
  7. The RP exchanges the code at POST /oidc/token/ (with the code_verifier, if it sent a code_challenge) and only then calls GET /oidc/userinfo/ with the bearer it got back — the code on the redirect is not a bearer